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Security	Arrangements	in	South	Sudan’s	Peace	Deal:
Do	No	Harm
by	Alex	de	Waal
In	South	Sudan’s	political	marketplace,	a	bad	peace	deal—or	a	badly-implemented	peace	deal—can	be	as	bad	as
no	deal	at	all.	A	collapsing	peace	deal	has	the	potential	of	unleashing	exceptionally	severe	violence.
According	to	the	‘do	no	harm’	precept,	those	who	design	peace	agreements	and	steer	their	implementation,	should
not	allow	optimism	of	the	will	to	befog	their	analytical	lenses.	We	must	always	read	the	politicking	around
implementing	a	peace	deal	with	the	default	supposition	that	the	deal	may	collapse	and	violence	may	break	out
again.
So	it	is	with	the	security	provisions	of	the	Revitalized	Agreement	on	the	Resolution	of	the	Conflict	in	South	Sudan
(R-ARCISS).
The	agreement,	constructed	by	two	masters	of	the	regional	political	marketplace—President	Omar	al	Bashir	of
Sudan	and	President	Yoweri	Museveni	of	Uganda—is	an	intricate	division	of	the	spoils.	Central	to	it	is	a	‘payroll
peace’:	specifically,	provisions	that	allow	the	warring	parties	to	put	hundreds	of	thousands	of	men	into	military
cantonment	sites	where	they	will	be	organised,	fed,	housed	and	perhaps	paid	or	provided	with	packages	for
disarmament,	demobilisation	and	reintegration.
Photo	Credit:	Randy	Fath,	Unsplash.
As	outlined	in	the	recent	CRP	memo	on	South	Sudan,	The	Perils	of	Payroll	Peace	this	is	a	recipe	for	the	parties	to
mobilise	soldiers	and	organise	them,	making	any	breakdown	in	the	peace	process	even	more	dangerous.	This	error
has	been	made	time	and	again—it’s	time	to	learn	the	lesson	that	the	security	arrangements	provisions	in	a	peace
deal	should	not	be	designed	so	as	to	create	perverse	incentives	for	organising	military	units.
The	plan	to	organise	a	‘unified	force’,	comprising	troops	from	government	and	opposition,	poses	an	even	greater
hazard.	Senior	government	officials	are	on	the	record	insisting	that	creating	such	a	unified	force	is	a	precondition
for	forming	the	transitional	government.
South	Sudan	and	Sudan	have	a	well-documented	history	that	attempts	to	unify,	integrate	or	absorb	forces	into	a
single	national	army	are	extraordinarily	complicated,	fraught	and	long-winded.	Despite	the	public	avowals	of	political
leaders,	they	always	maintain	a	powerful	reserve	of	loyal	troops	to	secure	their	own	position,	should	circumstances
change.	Only	the	weakest	allow	their	forces	to	be	integrated.
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This	is	a	worldwide	phenomenon:	in	a	comprehensive	review	of	post-civil	war	military	integration,	Ronald	Krebs	and
Roy	Licklider	come	to	the	simple	conclusion:	don’t!	Despite	the	ubiquity	of	provisions	for	integrating	government
and	rebel	forces	after	conflict,	there’s	no	systematic	evidence	that	it	works	to	reduce	the	risks	of	future	conflict,	and
much	evidence	to	the	contrary.
Crisis	Group	has	warned	against	this	too,	proposing	instead	‘a	small,	limited-mandate	third-party	protection	force	for
opposition	leaders,	the	least	objectionable	of	bad	options	for	Juba’s	security	arrangements.’
In	South	Sudan’s	political	marketplace,	turmoil	and	unpredictability	are	the	norm.	A	peace	agreement	shouldn’t	be
envisaged	as	a	proto-constitution,	a	once-in-a-generation	reformulation	of	the	nation’s	political	settlement.	Rather,
it’s	a	bargain	in	a	bazaar,	good	for	as	long	as	those	market	conditions	hold.
At	best,	a	peace	agreement	needs	constant	renegotiation	to	keep	it	alive—in	mediation	parlance,	space	for
implementation	protocols	and	appendices.	At	worst	it	is	a	breathing	space	in	which	the	parties	prepare	for	a	likely
new	war.	Accepting	this,	we	can	surely	design	peace	deals	to	maximize	the	opportunities	for	adaptive	renegotiation
and	to	minimize	the	risks	of	catastrophic	violence	should	they	falter.
	
Note:	The	CRP	blogs	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	the	Conflict	Research	Programme,	the
London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science,	or	the	UK	Government.
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